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TOWARD AN ACCOUNT OF INTOLERANCE:
BETWEEN PRISON RESISTANCE AND 
ENGAGED SCHOLARSHIP
Today, the word “intolerance” bears almost exclusively 
negative connotations. Intolerance refers to narrow-minded-
ness and petty provincialism, prejudice and bigotry. Intolerant 
people are anti-Semitic, Islamophobic, broadly xenophobic, 
racist, sexist, homophobic, cis-sexist, and/or eugenicist. Within 
the context of recent US politics, the term has also developed 
deep linguistic ties to the Anti-Americanism of Middle East ter-
rorist groups. This hermeneutic trajectory, as Wendy Brown 
argues, capitalizes on a longstanding semantic alignment of 
tolerance with civilized societies and intolerance with barba-
rism.1 Moreover, while there is growing debate within Western 
cosmopolitan culture over whether or not tolerance is a vir-
tue—as opposed to more robust values like acceptance, affir-
mation, respect, solidarity, or celebration—intolerance is 
typically treated as a vice. Even when their actions fail to bear 
this out, it is rare for someone—citizen or senator, employee or 
employer, community member or leader—to want to be known 
as an intolerant individual. In fact, the appellation of intoler-
ance is so vehemently disavowed, and justifications for such 
disavowals are so consistently absent as to suggest that the 
word’s monosignative character is an effect of ideology. This is 
to say that the supposition that “intolerance” is and ought to 
be restricted to one negative sense in common parlance is a 
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belief, so heavily repeated, reproduced, and reinscribed as to be 
taken for granted.
What would a rich, multivalent account of intolerance look 
like? What would it mean to reconceive of intolerance as a vir-
tue2—or, at the very least, a positive affect? Luckily, one need 
not settle in for some armchair philosophizing to answer such 
a question. There are historical discourses and practices that 
have explored precisely the contours of a positive intolerance. 
In what follows, I analyze two such archives: the records of Le 
Groupe d’information sur les prisons (the Prisons Information 
Group, the GIP) and the writings of one of its academic mem-
bers: Michel Foucault. For the GIP, intolerance—as a militant 
refusal of intolerable material and political conditions—is 
essential to the prison activist effort. Relatedly, for Foucault, 
scholarship—as the creative and/or critical act of naming intol-
erable conditions and changing public awareness thereof—can 
be a mode of political intolerance against an oppressive state. 
When paired together, these two complementary archives 
trouble the easy severance of theory and practice, suggesting 
both that prison resistance efforts involve intellectual assess-
ments of the intolerable and that engaged scholarship often 
doubles as intolerant activism. Both archives, moreover, agree 
that such intolerant activism is always rooted in personal invest-
ments and local struggles. This full analysis allows me to con-
clude that, if the struggle against forces of marginalization and 
exploitation mobilizes resistant intolerance as a political and 
intellectual strategy, then intolerance may very well be com-
mendable. It might, in fact, be virtuous. 
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I. THE ARCHIVE
The paired archives of the Prisons Information Group and 
Michel Foucault provide one exemplary instance of a robust, 
positive account of intolerance. Once the essential elements of 
this account have been culled, the relevance of its substantive 
insights into intolerance for resistance efforts today can be 
evaluated. 
The GIP was a French prison resistance network, active 
between 1970 and 1973. The GIP issued a clarion call to the 
French public, insisting that it become unapologetically intol-
erant of the intolerable conditions of prison specifically and a 
disciplinary society more generally. The GIP’s archive, Fond 
Groupe d’information sur les prisons, is currently housed at the 
Institut mémoires de l’édition contemporaine in L’Abbaye 
d’Ardenne, just outside of Caen, France. A representative 
selection of these materials—which include interviews, pam-
phlets, leaflets, media statements, questionnaires, newspaper 
clippings, magazines, essays (and handwritten drafts), photo-
graphs, paintings, lists of demands, reports, chronologies, legal 
dossiers, and more—have been published in Le Groupe 
d’information sur les prisons: Archives d’une lutte 1970–1972, 
Intolérable, and La Révolte de la prison de Nancy.3 It is across 
this archive and the scholarship circumnavigating it that I trace 
a rich sense of intolerance as a necessary affect and practice for 
the activist effort of prison resistance.
The choice to also consult the archive of writings by 
Michel Foucault warrants some explanation. I pair Foucault 
with the GIP not merely because he was a GIP member, a 
thinker of power and resistance, and an important theorist of 
criminality, deviancy, and incarceration. Foucault spearheaded 
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the GIP (at the behest of Daniel Defert) and served as its unof-
ficial leader, albeit in a quiet, often behind-the-scenes way.4 It 
is therefore the case that the instances of “intolerance” in the 
GIP archive occur under his watch and, in many cases, by his 
own hand. It is also the case, however, that Foucault employed 
the concepts of the intolerable and intolerance across his schol-
arly career, both before and after his involvement with the GIP. 
These two facts do not provide adequate justification for cred-
iting Foucault with the GIP’s account of intolerance. They do, 
however, establish Foucault’s scholarship as a complementary 
archive of intolerance. Today, that archive includes his pub-
lished books, his lectures at the Collège de France, and his 
essays and interviews, most of which are collected in Dits et 
écrits.5 Taking into account the entirety of his work, I trace 
Foucault’s sense of intolerance as, perhaps unexpectedly, a 
commendable function of academic scholarship.
II. INTOLERANCE AND PRISON RESISTANCE
Let me begin with an analysis of the GIP and its use of 
intolerance in the work of prison resistance. At a press confer-
ence on February 8, 1971, Foucault announced the formation 
of Le Groupe d’information sur les prisons. It was to be a 
group that publicized information about the prisons from pris-
oners themselves, thereby raising public awareness and inciting 
transformative action. Quickly thereafter, on March 15, 
Foucault published a brief statement announcing the GIP’s 
first information-gathering project: a questionnaire by which 
prisoners were invited to speak for themselves about prison 
conditions, the justice system, and necessary reforms. Jettisoning 
a dispassionate affect in this piece, Foucault deployed a loaded 
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family of terms, dubbing the questionnaire an “intolerance-
inquiry,” describing prison conditions as “intolerable,” and 
commending not merely awareness but “active intolerance” of 
the prison and its related disciplinary institutions. He writes,
Let what is intolerable—imposed, as it is, by force and 
by silence—cease to be accepted. We do not make our 
inquiry in order to accumulate knowledge, but to 
heighten our intolerance and make it an active intoler-
ance. Let us become people intolerant of prisons, the 
legal system, the hospital system, psychiatric practice, 
military service, etc.6
These terms—intolerable and intolerance—would become 
distinctive of the GIP enterprise. As group members put it, the 
GIP mobilized people in and outside the prison to protest the 
“intolerable” realities of class exploitation and marginalization 
that undergird this institution.7 To register that protest, the 
GIP undertook a number of “intolerance-inquiries,”8 the 
results of which were published in its primary publication 
series: the Intolerable pamphlets. These works decried the 
“intolerable” conditions of prison,9 marking not only the quo-
tidian realities of the cold, filth, violence, and malnutrition of 
incarceration, but more fundamental issues of egregious sen-
tences10 and sexual repression.11 For the GIP, the prison could 
not be understood or resisted in isolation; rather it was a node 
in a network of “intolerable” institutions, which included 
“courts, cops, hospital, asylums, school, military service, the 
press, TV, [and] the state.”12 It is for this reason that the GIP 
aimed to make it possible not only for prisoners “to formulate 
what is intolerable and to no longer tolerate it,” but for any 
group of people suffering under intolerable conditions to do 
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so.13 Such a “collective intolerance” manifested itself in prison 
revolts, hunger strikes, work stoppages, and media statements, 
as well as a wave of prison suicides in 1972.14 As Foucault 
would reflect a few years later, the GIP’s task was quite simple: 
to say, “there is a problem here, there is something here people 
didn’t tolerate and is not tolerable.”15
A rich and growing strand of scholarship has been devoted 
to the GIP, excavating its historical context, philosophical 
import, and contemporary relevance. That scholarship has 
focused on a number of GIP figures (Daniel Defert, Gilles 
Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jean Genet, George Jackson, and 
Serge Livrozet), coterminous movements (the Black Panthers, 
Comité d’action des prisonniers, Front homosexual d’action 
révolutionnaire, Lotta Continua, and Mouvement de libération 
des femmes), and related topics (activism, revolt, abolition, 
power, surveillance, hunger strikes, solitary confinement, care 
work, psychiatry, the public intellectual, the subaltern, speech, 
publicity, anonymity, racism, immigration, Maoism, and May 
’68). Within this range of projects, however, there is not a 
single study of the GIP’s trilogy of concepts: the intolerable, 
intolerance, and active intolerance. Scholars have addressed the 
notion of intolerance, but only in passing.16 This is a surprising 
state of affairs, given the saturation of these terms in the GIP 
archive and their consequent centrality to any account of polit-
ical resistance drawn from the GIP’s legacy. 
Intolerance against the Intolerable
In what follows, I map all three terms—the intolerable, 
intolerance, and active intolerance—across secondary literature 
on the GIP, aiming to distill the GIP’s contribution to an 
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account of intolerance as a wellspring not only of prison activ-
ism but of political resistance writ large. Moreover, insofar as 
intolerance, and indeed an active intolerance, is aimed at the 
intolerable, I will begin with this more fundamental term and 
then work outward to intolerance and active intolerance.
First, for the GIP, the intolerable is a material, experiential, 
and judicative state—coincident with unbearable physical and 
political conditions—that is necessarily spoken and shared. To 
start, how is the intolerable a material, experiential, and judica-
tive state? In GIP scholarship, the intolerable is often intro-
duced lexically, as what cannot be tolerated, whatever is 
“unacceptable,”17 “unbearable,”18 and “insufferable.”19 The 
term refers, most basically, to a set of material conditions that 
cause egregious suffering. Although such conditions are possi-
ble anywhere, across the social fabric and within every institu-
tion,20 the GIP applied the term primarily to prisons.21 The 
intolerable refers to the prison’s “quotidian” realities,22 its 
threats, as Michael Welch puts it, to the “salut” and “santé” 
(the health and safety) of prisoners.23 But it also refers to the 
prison’s “mechanisms,”24 including the production of illegal-
ity,25 recidivism,26 and other “failures.”27 Not simply a con-
glomerate of material facts and forces, the intolerable is 
fundamentally phenomenological, an “experience” of what is 
insufferable, a felt sense [ressenti], Audrey Kiéfer remarks, that 
something is unacceptable.28 It includes, moreover, the “sub-
jective reaction” provoked by that experience.29 This is to say 
that the intolerable cannot be registered mechanically; it can 
and must seize one’s affective core. And yet, precising this char-
acterization one step further, Kevin Thompson argues that the 
intolerable cannot be “simply a subjective, felt condition”;30 it 
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is also, inescapably, a “judgment.” It is an assessment of the 
unacceptability of “rigid and intransigent” relations that pre-
clude “genuine projects of self-fashioning.”31 As such, to rec-
ognize, experience, and judge the intolerable, as GIP members 
did, is to exercise ethical and political critique. It is to struggle 
for self and social transformation.
But now how is the intolerable necessarily “spoken” and 
shared?32 In the GIP’s case, that it is spoken means that the 
intolerable, on a very practical level, is “propagated” by docu-
ments33 and “formulated” through publicity.34 However, 
beneath this, Kiéfer argues, is something more basal: the intol-
erable “is to make known”35 and to make known or “to inform 
is to speak the intolerable.”36 This suggests that the intolerable 
is necessarily communicative, that it absolutely must be said—
as if to register it is already to formulate it, and to formulate it 
is already to pronounce it. Compounding this is a relational 
element: the intolerable is shared. While it is certainly experi-
enced “directly” by the targets of systemic oppression, it may 
equally be experienced “indirectly” through testimony.37 As a 
vibrant collaboration between prisoners, ex-prisoners, family 
members, lawyers, doctors, academics, and activists, the GIP 
capitalized on the infectious nature of the intolerable. 
Experiences of it reverberated empathically from prison to 
prison and from the solitary individual to the wider public. 
Moving across an intricate system of relays, these experiences 
catalyzed the movement precisely because the force of the 
intolerable passed through each of its members. The GIP 
facilitated a space in which people voiced their own agonies and 
were, as Leonard Lawlor puts it, “forced to listen to the agony 
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of others,” “forced to become intolerant of the intolerable”; 
the GIP “communicated the feeling of intolerance.”38
What then is intolerance? For GIP scholars, intolerance is 
a condition of militancy, produced by the intolerable and 
expressed in speech acts and political practices. For the GIP, 
intolerance is prima facie “political.”39 It is an “act of resis-
tance,”40 part and parcel of an “anti-oppressive struggle.”41 As 
such, it cannot be “neutral, impartial, or unbiased,”42 embed-
ded in desanguinated academic inquiry or expressive of scien-
tific disinterest. In fact, as it appears in the GIP, intolerance is 
essentially confrontational. It “defies” the intolerable,43 
“rejects” it,44 “refuses” the preclusion of possibility,45 and ulti-
mately “confronts” the carceral state and its globalizing 
power.46 Intolerance is, therefore, wholly “militant.”47 This 
political militancy manifests itself in speech acts and political 
practices. For the GIP, intolerance begins with speaking the 
intolerable. As Grégory Salle states, “énoncer, c’est déjà dénon-
cer”—or, to pronounce is already to denounce.48 
Commensurately, it is an intolerant act to “give the floor” to 
those who have been silenced49 and to “echo,” “amplify,” and 
make their words “resound.”50 It is the height of intolerance to 
“publicize,” “proliferate,” and “disseminate” information pro-
vided by the targets of an oppressive system.51 In addition to 
denunciative speech, moreover, intolerance also involves cer-
tain practices of cultivation. Those practices include general 
“strategies and tactics” of political transformation,52 as well as 
“intercorporeal solidarity” and what Lisa Guenther terms 
“creaturely politics.”53 For her, it is creaturely needs, desires, 
and capacities that motivate and sustain resistant political life. 
By affirming creaturely politics, the GIP’s intolerance compro-
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mises the binaries of the weighty and the insignificant, the 
public and the private, necessary and unnecessary evils that 
undergird oppressive ideologies and forces of marginalization.
Given the essential militancy of intolerance, coupled with 
its manifestation in speech and practice, intolerance appears to 
be inescapably active. How, then, does active intolerance differ 
from intolerance? And what does it mean to “make [intoler-
ance] an active intolerance”? Active intolerance is perhaps best 
characterized as an accelerated and transmogrifying collective 
resistance to the intolerable. The French phrase intolérance 
active appears nowhere else in the published collections of GIP 
documents.54 This creates some interpretive difficulty. From a 
linguistic standpoint, intolérance active might mean an ener-
getic and dynamic intolerance. It might also mean an acceler-
ated (accéléré) intolerance, given the GIP context of circulation 
and growth. From a hermeneutical standpoint, the meaning of 
active intolerance might best be derived from the achievements 
of the GIP itself, assuming it embodied active intolerance. In 
that case, the term would refer to the transitive growth of intol-
erant feeling, speaking, and practice built on an assessment of 
the intolerable. Looking to the GIP, Dylan Rodríguez defines 
active intolerance as “an insurgency of knowledge,”55 which, 
Lisa Guenther adds, produces “the creation of new possibilities 
for inter-corporeal life.”56 Moreover, focusing on the transitiv-
ity of insurgent knowledge and creaturely politics, Andrew 
Dilts and I have suggested active intolerance refers to a “col-
laborative abolitionist effort, trained on subjugated knowledges 
and generative beyond itself, both temporally and geographi-
cally.”57 Active intolerance, here, is an increasing and transfor-
mative collective resistance to the intolerable. It carries with it 
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all the relational, communicative, judicative, experiential, and 
material elements of intolerance to the intolerable, but it 
deploys those elements on an accelerated scale, across geo-
graphical and institutional barriers, in the same service of 
refusal and creative transformation.
In sum, the GIP archive offers rich contributions to an 
account of intolerance. For its members, intolerance is an 
affect, a judgment, and a practice, brazenly endorsed as a 
political virtue in the fight against marginalization, structural 
oppression, violence, and silencing. That intolerance grows out 
of the intolerable and grows into active intolerance. Ultimately, 
it is the feeling of the intolerable that becomes the feeling of 
intolerance; it is the saying of the intolerable that becomes an 
intolerant denunciation; and it is the sharing of the intolerable 
that becomes acts of intolerance and active intolerance.58 This 
account of intolerance places it at the heart of a specific prison 
activist effort. And, insofar as the failures of the prison system 
remain the same—dehumanization, violence, and injustice—
the GIP commends intolerance to prison activist efforts today. 
More than this, however, this GIP-like intolerance to material 
conditions of suffering, to experiences of desubjectivation, and 
its conviction that things must not go on like this—that is the 
pulse of political resistance movements writ large. This kind of 
intolerance is their lifeblood. 
III. INTOLERANCE AND ENGAGED SCHOLAR-
SHIP
While intolerance may lie at the root of political resistance, 
it is not the exclusive purview of activism. I turn now, through 
the writings of Michel Foucault, to explore the modes of intol-
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erance that are at work in the archives as much as in the streets. 
Examining some of his most significant references to the term, 
I distill two key reflections on the nature of intolerance. First, 
thresholds of intolerance change according to shifting currents 
of power. They are not reflections of either natural law or struc-
tural necessity. Second, professional academics are integral to 
the construction and reproduction of these changing thresh-
olds. As institutional deputies, scholars are then quite often 
part and parcel of the intolerable systems against which activist 
groups like the GIP labor. Nevertheless, due to their institu-
tional function, scholars can also become intolerant agitators, 
capable of refusing oppressive systems and disrupting their 
determination of sensibilities, of what can and cannot be 
accepted or endured. Foucault himself aspired to become just 
such a scholar. From a GIP/Foucauldian perspective, then, 
resistant intolerance is commendable, not only as a wellspring 
of political activism but as a vibrant potentiality for scholarship. 
Across Dits et écrits, Foucault attends carefully to shifts in 
public thresholds of intolerance. He repeatedly notes the rela-
tive “tolerance” exercised toward the mad before the mid-sev-
enteenth century, followed by a more recent intolerance.59 
Likewise, he frequently remarks on the nineteenth century’s 
unique “intolerance” of homosexuals, followed by a more 
recent tolerance.60 Perhaps most commonly, Foucault notes 
changes in the toleration of illegalities, changes that directly 
construct the social significance of criminality. In The Punitive 
Society, for example, Foucault locates a shift in intolerance 
toward delinquents at the turn of the nineteenth century.61 The 
bourgeoisie instigated a widespread crackdown on petty crime 
and rural misconduct. In so doing, they cultivated intolerance 
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to such illegalisms as a way to construct the figure of the delin-
quent and instantiate a new regime of work, property, and 
exploitation. Foucault then formally identified this shift, in 
Discipline and Punish, as foundational to the modern prison 
and carceral society in the West. Whether he is addressing the 
mad, the delinquent, or the homosexual, however, Foucault 
notes essential shifts in the nature and exercise of power, such 
that thresholds of both tolerance and intolerance take on spe-
cific configurations that solidify reigning hierarchies.62 
Institutional forces cultivate public intolerances that serve 
dominant power formations.
Scholars play an integral role in changing thresholds of 
tolerance and intolerance. For instance, Foucault asserts that, 
at the end of the nineteenth century, scholars made incest no 
longer “tolerable,” through the construction of sexology, soci-
ology, and other forms of discourse.63 This theoretical con-
struction then gained judicial function. “The great interdiction 
of incest,” he writes, “is an invention of intellectuals.”64 In this 
moment, scholars served as the functionaries of power, binding 
more tightly together the forces of knowledge production and 
policing. Emphasizing the weight of this collusion, Foucault 
remarks, in The Punitive Society, that, “For a repressive State 
apparatus really to function, it must be tolerated. Now, two 
great mechanisms make this toleration possible”: 1) transfer 
tasks of control and repression from the state to various mar-
ginalized strata, or 2) ensure that the state apparatus, while 
kept within the ruling class and serving the dominant interests, 
also serves local interests from time to time.65 On the first 
model of producing tolerance for a repressive or disciplinary 
state, that state must transfer control to substrata; these sub-
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strata may include intellectuals and professionals, such as law-
yers, doctors, magistrates, sociologists, educators, philosophers, 
et cetera. Intellectuals are mediators who may carry out the 
work of the state by solidifying public tolerance of power dif-
ferentials and entrenching intolerable conditions. In a ruthless 
passage, Foucault states that many intellectuals have become 
dupes of bourgeois ideology and, subsequent to their profes-
sorships, they have further become investees of bourgeois 
power.66 Whether as an expression of that investment or a for-
mative force on that ideology, such intellectuals collude with 
judicial formations. 
In sum, the vicissitudes of force and struggle alter the con-
tours of public intolerance. One chief means of that alteration 
is academic industry, which generates new concepts and curi-
osities, whole discourses and regimes of veridiction. Scholars 
are, then, in a unique position to enhance tolerance of a repres-
sive or disciplinary state, to preclude the recognition of intoler-
able conditions, and to support the reproduction of those very 
conditions. For Foucault, however, this is only one side of the 
story.
Transforming Thresholds of Tolerance and Intolerance
In several places, Foucault explores how scholars can resist 
the intolerable through the practice of intolerance. These 
explorations name at least two specific modes of scholarly work 
consonant with such intolerance: literature and critique. While 
political resistance is certainly to be found in activist endeavors, 
it also lives and breathes in art and theory. Creative and critical 
scholarship are powerful and yet perhaps underappreciated 
tools in the service of social transformation.  
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In “Lives of Infamous Men,” Foucault reflects on the his-
tory of documentation, moving from fabulous tales of royal or 
noble exploits, to the juridical and penal reports of quotidian 
life, and ending finally with administrative records of minutiae 
captured along a capillary network of diffuse power. The his-
tory of fiction, he suggests, tracks this development: fable was 
sufficient for the first era, while modern literature, with its 
emphasis on the quotidian, developed in tandem with the sec-
ond.67 Although modern literature is coincident with juridical 
and penal documentation systems, however, Foucault insists it 
is not copacetic with them. As he writes, literature is always 
inherently
searching for things hardest to perceive—the most 
hidden, hardest to tell and to show, and lastly most 
forbidden and scandalous. . . . [It is] determined 
[acharnée] to seek out the quotidian beneath the quo-
tidian itself, to cross boundaries [limites], to ruthlessly 
or insidiously bring our secrets out in the open, to 
displace rules and codes, to compel the unmention-
able [inavouable] to be told; it will thus tend to place 
itself outside the law, or at least to take on the burden 
of scandal, transgression, or revolt. More than any 
other form of language, it remains the discourse of 
“infamy”: it has the duty of saying what is most resis-
tant to being said—the worst, the most secret, the 
most intolerable [intolérable], the shameless.68
As the GIP insisted time and again, naming the intolerable is 
itself an act of intolerance.69 By asserting that literature names 
the intolerable, Foucault suggests that certain works of creative 
scholarship are capable of the same resistant intolerance as 
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political protests, media insurgencies, and investigation com-
missions. It is literature’s power to name, to depict the material 
and experiential reality of the intolerable, that makes it a tool 
of political intolerance.
Although Foucault sometimes claimed to be publishing 
works of fiction,70 it was more common for him to characterize 
his scholarly work as a practice of critique. Critique, he writes, 
is the “historical analysis of the limits imposed on us” paired 
with “an experiment with the possibility of going beyond 
them.”71 If “limits” can refer to thresholds of tolerance and 
intolerance, as he suggests in History of Madness,72 then critical 
scholarship must both illuminate and shift those thresholds. 
Foucault later states this explicitly. On the necessity of analyz-
ing thresholds, he writes, “the thresholds of intolerance in a 
society merit great attention, as much from the point of view 
of historical reflection as that of political analysis. For this is not 
simply an issue of ‘sensibility,’ it is also an issue of resistance, of 
the capacity to refuse and the will to fight.”73 Analysis precon-
ditions the insight and resolve requisite for political resistance. 
These thresholds, however, must not simply be analyzed; they 
must be changed. In a 1978 interview, in the context of fore-
swearing overly ambitious scholarly endeavors, Foucault states:
My project is far from being of comparable scope. To 
give some assistance, in wearing away certain self-evi-
dences and commonplaces about madness, normality, 
illness, crime and punishment; to bring it about, 
together with many others, that certain phrases can no 
longer be spoken so lightly, certain acts no longer, or 
at least no longer so unhesitatingly, performed; to 
contribute to changing certain things in people’s way 
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of perceiving and doing things; to participate in this 
difficult displacement of forms of sensibility and 
thresholds of tolerance. . . . I hardly feel capable of 
attempting much more than that.74
Foucault here admits to the critical work of “wearing away” 
what has become self-evident and commonplace, of displacing 
“thresholds of tolerance.” It is a deceptively modest claim. For, 
to effect these shifts is in fact to subvert established power 
structures and forces of control. Institutionalized thresholds of 
tolerance and intolerance become sedimented over time. When 
they have sunk so deeply into the social fabric as to be taken for 
granted and are no longer susceptible to change by the people 
subject to them, that itself is “intolerable.”75 To make these 
frozen and crystallized power formations mobile and fluid 
again is the consummate Foucauldian act of resistance, opening 
the space for self and social transformation.76 This is the work 
of critique.
Whether it be literature or critique, Foucault sees scholar-
ship as a conduit of intolerance. Among more overt acts of 
political antagonisms, these forms of intellectual production 
can also effect transformation in the name of freedom. In his 
preface to Mireille Debard and Jean-Luc Hennig’s Les Juges 
kaki, an account of French military courts and tribunals, from 
1975 to 1977, Foucault contextualizes scholarly work within 
the larger framework of political struggle. On the one hand, 
the battle is waged by direct defiance of state power itself; on 
the other, it is waged by sensitizing oneself, raising one’s con-
sciousness and lowering the thresholds at which one tolerates 
violence, intimidation, and inequality. Debard and Hennig’s 
book, he asserts, “follows this [latter] path.”77 He writes, 
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It is well known that the quiet strength of the state 
shrouds its violence; laws cover over its illegalism; and 
rules its injustice. The whole swarm of abuses, 
excesses, and irregularities forms not the inevitable 
deviation, but the essential and abiding life of the 
“rule of law.” The bad character of the prosecutor, the 
indigestion of the judge, or the torpor of the jury are 
not snags in the universality of law, instead they assure 
its well-ordered exercise. And these games, with all 
their uncertainties, risks, threats, and traps, facilitate 
not a violent political regime, really, but an average, 
everyday level of fear—what we might call a “state of 
fear” [État de peur], lived out by individuals beneath 
the rule of law [État de droit].
This, then, is the problem that must be posed in every 
society that functions on this model: how to extract 
this illegalism from the legality that shelters it? How 
to wrest this violence from the shadow and familiarity 
that render it nearly invisible? How to make these 
things stand out starkly against the greyness of the 
general mechanisms that lend them such an air of 
inevitability, and, ultimately, tolerability [d’être 
tolérables]?
We can defy hidden violence in such a way as to draw 
it out from the well-ordered apparatus within which it 
is ensconced. We can provoke it, instigating a reaction 
on its part so strong as to be immeasurable, rendering 
it so unacceptable that we cannot, in fact, accept it any 
longer. We can grate against the average state of fear 
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until it gets red hot. This is a strategy of war: the “rise 
to extremes.”
We can also work in the other direction: in lieu of 
rendering the mechanisms of power more menacing, 
we can lower the threshold at which we tolerate [sup-
porte] them, work to make the skin more irritable and 
the sensibilities more recalcitrant, sharpen an intoler-
ance [intolérance] to power’s effects and the habitua-
tions that muffle them, make more pronounced 
whatever about them is small, fragile, and conse-
quently accessible; modify the balance of fear, not by 
an intensification that terrifies, but by an assessment of 
reality that, literally, “encourages.”78
It is a sharp contrast Foucault here draws between defying the 
state or even provoking its brute power, on the one hand, and 
working to change sensibilities or more keenly sensitize them, 
on the other. For him, scholarship can “make the skin more 
irritable and the sensibilities more recalcitrant.” It can unmask 
the hidden machinations of power and throw off the repressive 
or disciplinary vestments of scholastic standing. From this per-
spective, the classic division between activism, art, and theory 
just cannot hold. Rather, they are capable together of raising 
intolerant voices against an intolerable society.
This is the promise of scholarship: to identify, name, 
experiment with, and change the intolerable limits produced by 
a long sedimentation of power relations. But of course, not 
every instance of scholarship is intolerant in this sense. What, 
then, are the conditions under which scholarship becomes so? 
In the GIP archive, the work of intolerance starts with an expe-
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rience of the intolerable, a gripping, relentless experience of 
diminished possibilities and injustice judged to be so insuffer-
able it must be collectively and progressively decried. This 
consistent theme in the GIP archive is reprised by Foucault. 
For him, the work of intolerance is rooted in personal invest-
ments and local struggles. In an interview in which Foucault 
and Deleuze reflect on their involvement in the GIP move-
ment, Foucault says,
If the fight is directed against power, then all those on 
whom power is exercised to their detriment, all who 
find it intolerable, can begin the struggle on their own 
terrain and on the basis of their proper activity (or pas-
sivity). In engaging in a struggle that concerns their 
own interests, whose objectives they clearly under-
stand and whose methods only they can determine, 
they enter into a revolutionary process.79
This intolerance, whether through scholarship or activism, 
begins among people targeted by oppressive power structures 
and yet ready to generate their own resistance strategies. 
Foucault claims that all of his research has in fact begun in 
this way.80 Take The Punitive Society as a case in point. Frédéric 
Gros claims Foucault aimed in these lectures not “to deploy a 
rhetoric of exclusion, to denounce an intolerant society [une 
société intolérante], or to valorize the margins” but rather to 
systematically critique the framework of exclusion itself as 
insufficient to explain more subtle tactics of sanction such as 
sequestration, confinement, and eventually incarceration.81 
While Foucault certainly does critique the framework of exclu-
sion here, I propose that The Punitive Society is in fact a form 
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of denouncing—or of not tolerating—an intolerant society. 
Stemming from his involvement in the GIP, The Punitive 
Society develops from a felt sense of the intolerable, a sense that 
began with the incarceration of May ’68 leaders and only inten-
sified as he began communicating with prisoners, talking to 
their families, and meeting with ex-prisoners on the outside. As 
a work of scholarship, The Punitive Society lays the groundwork 
for a critical understanding of the modern prison and carceral 
society in the West. As such, it is exemplary of a scholar’s resis-
tance to merely replicating structures of a repressive, disciplin-
ary, and biopolitical state and instead working to lower the 
tolerability of systems of penal as well as academic power, 
thereby practicing a resistant intolerance. Moreover, insofar as 
The Punitive Society houses the preliminary research for 
Discipline and Punish, which itself has fueled critical prison 
studies and prison resistance networks across the globe, these 
lectures form part of a collaborative effort—temporally and 
geographically extensive. The Punitive Society plays a part in the 
mobilization of active intolerance.
The GIP and Foucault archives agree that when political 
work is rooted in local knowledge, embodied struggle, and col-
lective refusal, it is capable of rupturing thresholds of tolerance 
and intolerance. Scholarship is not inherently divorced from 
the world, confined to an ivory tower, and indifferent to the 
people with whom it is concerned. It is available for the work 
of intolerance, wherever the scholar experiences the intolerable, 
whether directly or indirectly. It is available, tooth and nail, for 
the project of world transformation and social justice.
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I V. CONCLUSION
In a world saturated in xenophobic violence, the question 
is not, paradoxically, whether intolerance can be commended in 
good faith. The Prisons Information Group and Michel 
Foucault are part of a rich history of successfully practicing 
intolerance against the oppressive forces of marginalization and 
exclusion. In the spirit of these archives, the question to be 
asked today is a different one. Ought we to be more intolerant 
than we are? Folded within that question is a series of others: 
Where do we stand in relation to dominant systems of power? 
And how are we positioned differently? How do we buttress 
and replicate disciplinary thresholds of tolerance or repressive 
standards of intolerance? How do we disrupt them? And what 
is the scholar’s role in this effort? Who among us is already 
doing this disruptive work and why? Does our own scholarly 
work replicate a certain tolerance of intolerable conditions? If 
so, which ones? Does it shift thresholds of intolerance? Is it 
linked to other people, projects, and public engagements as a 
form of active intolerance? Does it begin locally? Are we 
invested?
Some may be concerned by the tenor of these questions 
and, indeed, any call to practice intolerance. Surely the world 
needs less intolerance, not more. Even if it is the resistant intol-
erance of the GIP/Foucauldian archives, what safeguards its 
recommendation against cooptation by intolerance of another 
sort? I wish to underscore the significant schematic differences 
between the intolerance herein commended and that which is 
at work in xenophobic violence. To begin with, xenophobia is 
a response of disdain toward what is constructed as strange, 
foreign, or different: the other. Resistant intolerance, on the 
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other hand, is a response of refusal toward what is eminently 
familiar: the day in and day out experience of existential threat, 
the sense that one really cannot survive under these conditions. 
This intolerance begins with someone’s suffering and judging 
it to be insufferable. It is fueled by a sense of injustice, rather 
than disdain, fear, or hatred.82 Moreover, while xenophobic 
intolerance involves a refusal to see or to acknowledge another 
person or group of persons, resistant intolerance involves a 
commitment to speak and to listen. Through this intolerance, 
the targets of oppressive systems name the intolerable, while 
others facilitate their ability to speak and to be heard. Such 
speech necessarily stems from the side of the marginalized. And 
yet, the force of resistant intolerance is not centripetal, merely 
local, or identitarian; rather, it reaches outward, connecting 
people together in an ever-expanding movement of collective 
passions and actions. In Regulating Aversion, Wendy Brown 
argues that at the heart of liberal tolerance lurks a hostility, 
repugnance, and regulation inherent in the settler colonial 
project. I would argue, conversely, that at the heart of resistant 
intolerance lives the sort of solidarity, courage, and hope neces-
sary for deterritorial and decarceral struggles. 
Today, assessments of the intolerable are pouring from our 
prisons, universities, and beyond. Prisoners decry malnutrition, 
physical and administrative violence, and the corporate monop-
oly governing jails, prisons, and detention centers.83 In 2013, 
the Pelican Bay Hunger Strike specifically targeted indefinite 
solitary confinement. This year, in perhaps the largest prison 
strike in history, prisoners are protesting conditions of forced 
labor, whether through explicit or implicit coercion. On the 
other hand, university campuses are awash in student demand 
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for the diversification of curriculum and faculty representation, 
the expansion of mental health services, and justice for sexual 
assault survivors. In a growing awareness of class analysis, 
moreover, students are protesting the student debt and adjunct 
crises and demanding widespread unionization. Faculty are 
protesting frozen wages and ever increasing teaching and ser-
vice loads, egregious layoffs, racially motivated tenure denials, 
departmental closures, and assaults on academic freedom. 
Many such protests target the corporatization of higher educa-
tion, which has involved a growing allegiance to bureaucracy 
over pedagogy and statistics over reflective excellence. In the 
United States, the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement is 
arguably one of the most powerful and poignant contemporary 
acts of intolerance in an intolerable world. Against white 
supremacy, replete as it is with injustice, violence, and silencing, 
BLM vows to resist the many forms of state violence targeting 
Black people and (re)build the Black liberation movement, 
placing marginalized Black lives at its center.84
Insofar as political inequality and xenophobic violence are 
germane to our current existence as human beings on this 
earth, intolerable realities seem to be inescapable. Whether 
those realities are the ones we live ourselves or experience 
through others, however, they have the potential to become 
active in us—to grip us with an unshakeable fury. To demand 
our response, at once raw and reflective. To incite us to collec-
tive art, activism, and scholarship in the service of freedom. 
That is, they have the potential to activate intolerance.85
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